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DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON 
SAUDI ARABIA'S DEVELOPMENT* 
Robert E. Looney 
INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, development was widely regarded as a large-
ly economic phenomenon. As a result, the main quantitative in-
dicator of.' a country's development status was its gross domestic 
product. While this index does measure one of the key aspects 
of development, the accumulation of wealth and productive power, 
it is clearly inadequate as an indicator of the country's social 
and institutional characteristics and level of progress. In par-
ticular, pure economic measures of development are often quite 
weakly connected to some of the demographic determinants of fer-
tility and mortality, themselves presumed to be a function as 
well as determinant of economic growth (Adelman and Morris 1965). 
Nowhere is the discrepancy between per capita income and the 
normal patterns of demographic change more obvious than in Saudi 
Arabia. 
Since the publicly available demographic statistics for Saudi 
Arabia are incomplete, it is not possible to construct a totally 
accurate picture of the country's population dynamics. What data 
that is available does indicate some patterns:, however, and can 
be made to serve most of the purposes of this study. The method-
ology used here is to hypothesize on the basis of general know-
ledge, demographic movements likely to be taking place in the 
Kingdom. 
POPULATION SIZE 
The actual size of Saudi Arabia's population has been a 
subject of controversy for some years. A summary report, released 
by the government in 1976, estimates the country's population at 
7,012,642. Table 1 shows some figures given by different sources. 
While there is some do11.1bt as to the size of Saudi Arabia's 
population, there is little question that the total is growing 
very rapidly. This expansion is takin$ place through stepped up , 
immigration and a relatively high natural growth of indigenous 
Saudis. However, the good statistics on the country's 
*Original English 
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population size, structure, and on the number of births and 
deaths, leaves the magnitude of a number of important demo-
graphic trends in doubt. On the other hand, there is substantial 
evidence that sever•l of the Arab countries in the region with 
fairly good demographic data are likely to have similar demog-
raphic patterns. In depth analysis of the demographic dynamics 
of these countries, particularly Jordan and Kuwait, has identi-
fied a number of commom elements bearing on several key para-
meters (Royal Commission· 1977). Using what Saudi data is avail-
able, and making comparisons with these neighbouring countries, 
one can, based on expected levels of birth and death rates, in-
directly infer the natural growth of the Kingdom's population. 
GENERAL ARAB DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS 
The Arab countries as a group have certain economic and 
demographic characteristics (Choucri 1980) that distinguish 
them from other countries in other geographic areas. Saudi 
Arabia and most of the other oil exporting countries are in 
large part still in the early stages of development and demO-"· 
graphic transition, i.e. large families are the norm rather than 
the exception. In addition, even though experiencing severe 
labour shortages, they maintain a number of customs on female 
participation in all parts of society. In general, the less 
affluent Arab countries, while capital deficient, have at least 
until very recently had abundant labour. These countries are 
also less reserved concerning fem~le participation in the lab-
our force. Several countries in this group, Egypt in particular, 
have introduced family planning programmes~ In contrast, Saudi 
Arabia has strictly forbidden the introduction of any contracep-
tive measures into the Kingdom to check the increase in popula-
tion. The two groups of countries complement each other in 
several .ways. In particular, a considerable flow of capital and 
human resources takes place within the region proving highly 
beneficial to both groups (Birks and Sinclair 1979). 
With several notable exceptions, Saudi Arabla's demq-
graphic patterns show a marked similarity to those experienced in 
the region as a whole. The average rate of population growth, 
in both Saudi Arabia and the Arab region, is around 3 per cent 
a year, and, in both instances, fertility rates are high. The 
demographic structure of these countries is characterized by 
the youthfulness of the population; in most of the Arab count-
ries, the proportion aged 15 years or under accounts for over 48 
per cent of the population. The rate of the economically active 
population is low, ranging from 22 per cent to 32 per cent of 
the total population, with the female participation rate vary-
ing from 3.5 per cent to 18.5 per cent. In the non-agricultural 
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sector, the average activity rate of women (over the age of 15) 
usually does not exceed 6 per cent (ECWA 1977). 
Arab countries are also characterized by their high infant 
mortality rates. In 1975, these ranged from 60 to 200 per 
thousand (ECWA 1977). Illiteracy rates for the group, as a whole, 
are also high and they are significantly higher among women than 
among men. The illiteracy rate for the Arab countries, as a whole, 
averaged (1975) around 47 per cent for males over 15 years old; 
it exceeded 70 per cent for females in this age group. In nearly 
all of these countries, there has been increasing concern over 
the amount and quality of education received by women. The result 
has been that spec~al attention is currently being directed to-
ward girls' education (Abu-laban 1976). This is clearly reflected 
in the increased proportion of girls (ages 6-24) enrolled at 
various educational levels. For the Arab countries as a whole, 
this proportion rose from around 14.3 per cent in 1960 to around 
25 per cent in 1975. In spite of the progress, female illiteracy 
rates in Arab countries are still among the highest in the world. 
When it comes to participating in the work force, Arab 
women tend to be concentrated in agriculture. In Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, and the two Yemens, for example, rural female 
activity rates for women are about twice as high as in the urban 
areas. Female employment in these countries is apparently accep-
table as long as it is confined to family farms • When families 
move to the city, however, females seem forced, for one reason 
or another, out of the labour force (Azzaro 1979). 
Educational levels, customs, traditions and social obliga-
tions, among other socio-economic factors, all have been used 
to explain the rather unique pattern of labour participation 
rates exhibited by Arab women. Many countries in the region de-
clare their rigid commitment to the teaching of Islam as a code 
of teachings and as a way of life and behaviour; yet one can 
easily conclude that Moslem women's deprivation from assuming 
a more active particpation in various activities in public life, 
in political, intellectual, social and economic areas, is rather 
based on rigid understanding, in some countries, of the teach-
ings of Islam. This approach ~s not principally founded on the 
preachings of the Koran; that Holy Book does not approve the im-
position of a negative role on women; it rather calls for making 
educational opportunities available for women as much as they 
are open to men. • 
Arab families have emphasized early marriage for girls. In 
addition, the high value of children in Arab culture has con-
tributed to fertility levels that. are very high by international 
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standards and has restricted women to household activities 
and child raising. 
GENERAL DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY 
Most of the recent empirical work on fertility patterns, 
in both developing and developed regions of the world, rests 
on the assumption that couples act rationally to maximize 
their welfare (Yotopoulus and Nugent 1976). At the household 
level, this concept relates to ~ertinent household decision 
making where families are confronted with many interrelated 
options such as adjustments in fertility, whether the wife 
can work or not, and whether the children can have many or a 
few years of formal education. 
At the national level, the assumption relates to a sit-
uation that can be accepted as the broader and more compreh-
ensive standard representation of the household. The theory 
is,therefore,extended to relate to socio-economic and demog-
raphic conditions through a system of simultaneous relation-
ships (Schultz 1972). 
Whether rationality and economic calculations of this 
sort permeate the typical Arab household is a matter of great 
controversy. Because of scepticism over the applicability of 
rational behav~our models to the Arab household, very little 
empirical research was, until quite recently, carried out to 
analyze and test these socio-ecopomic determinants of ferti-
lity and female labour force participation. Despite stepped 
up empirical work, many of the cause-effect relationships in 
this area between fertility and female labour force partici-
pation are still unknown. Recent findings (Tabbarah 1978), 
have however, begun to fill significant gaps in our knowledge 
about the Arab family and female behaviour. 
ARAB FERTILITY PATTERNS 
Fertility studies for specific countries in the region 
have all found a strong correlation between the fertility rate 
and level of education. These results confirm an important 
finding documented in other developing areas that fertility 
declines as the level of education of women rises. While the 
overall education-fertility pattern ~s now well established, 
it appears that a certain level of educational attainment is 
necessary before a noticeable drop in fertility rates can 
occur. 
- 07 
Population Bulletin of ECWA 
In summarizing research carried out on Arab fertility 
(Tabbarah 1978) most studies found the major variables correl-
ated with fertility to be as follows:-
1. Levels of infant mortality: fertility tends to 
vary directly with this figure; 
2. The degree of urbanization: this is almost always 
inversely related to levels of fertility; 
3. Level of education or literacy and female labour 
force participation: for most countries, these are 
negatively related to levels of fertility; 
4. The level of per capita income or standard of living 
and fertility: here,the relationship tends to vary from 
country to country; 
5. Social status of females. 
It should be noted that most of these variables, while 
significant for individual Arab countries, have not been shown 
to be correlated with fertility for the region as a whole. The 
relationship with per capita income illustrates the problem of 
generalizing ~bout demographic patterns in the area. Apparentl~ 
increasing per capita income causes many Arab families to emph-
asize a better quality of living and increased education for 
their children. Thus, the tendency is to opt for fewer children 
who will be sure of receiving the material requisites of life. 
On the other hand, however, an increasing level of family in-
come seems to generate a tendency for Arab families to consume 
more of everything in general and to have more children. These 
two effects ma¥, or may not, offset each other when considered· 
simultaneously. 
SAUDI FERTILITY PATTERNS 
What we know about Saudi fertility patterns comes largely 
from a multipurpose survey conducted by the Saudi Arabian Cent-
ral Department of Statistics during 1976 and 1977. From that 
survey (Rashid and Casady 1917) a live birth rate of 54.2 per 
1,000 was calculated for the Saudi population. This is some-
what above the U.N. figure of 49.5 for the country and over 
the average for Arab countries of 46.6 for 1975 (Table 2). 
According to the multipurpose survey,live birth rates for 
Saudis vary considerably from town to village. Live bitths were 
41 per 1,000 in the six largest municipalities, 54 per 1,000 
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high 61 per 1,000 in villages and other rural areas. 
S~veral factors have been cited for these patterns: 
1. Many Saudi men•live and 'work in urban areas where wages 
are high, while their families remain in rural areas 
where housing is more readily available and less expen-
sive. 
2. Women who have accompanied their husbands to urban 
areas of ten return to the parental home for the birth 
of a child. 
3. Traditionally, family size is larger in rural areas 
of the Kingdom. 
These seem plausible enough and, given the rather limited 
education of Saudi women, their exclusion from the work force 
and the government's ban on the importation of contraceptives, 
it is fairly safe to argue that no major reduction is likely 
to occu~ at least through the 1980s. 
Finally, one of the questions asked on the survey was 
how many children each married Saudi woman had borne in her 
lifet~me. Thirty-two per cent of the women, fifteen years and 
over, had at least seven children in their lifetime. Only 12 
per cent had never had ~ child. Many of these childless women 
(37 per cent) were under twenty. The survey also indicated 
that the average size of a completed family was 7.2 •. The women 
child ratio was 8 to 1, again one of the highest in the world. 
MORTALITY GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The decline in mortality is an integral component of the 
process of socio-economic development and modernization. In 
part, its role in modernization is definitional and results 
from its pre-eminent position as a social indicator; no country 
would qualify as modern in the standard sense of the term if 
it failed to significantly ieduce its death rate from its his-
torical levels. 
A number of important relationships tend to exist between 
mortality and other growth-inducing variables. For example, a 
decline in death rates contributes to the return to many forms 
of investment that are necessary to achieve high levels of 
economic production. Most obvious among these are investments 
in one's personal economic future such as schooling and train-
ing. Presumably, the longer the period over which one expects 
the benefits to accrue, the greater the expected value of such 
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investments as improvements in other factors of production 
such as irrigation or land reclamation (Yotopoulous and Nugent 
1976). 
From the purely macro-economic point of view, it seems 
clear that the major consequence of mortality change is in its 
effects on population growth rates. There is now abundant evi-
dence that mortality decline should not be expected to induce 
an equally large reduction in fertility, usually for at least 
several generations. Therefore, population growth tends to 
accelerate for an extended period following declines in mor-
tality. 
The effects of accelerated population growth on economic 
progress is controversial. On the one hand, a main line of ar-
gument suggests that more population retards the growth-of out-
put per worker. The overwhelmingly important element in the 
Malthusian theory is that of diminishing returns to labour, as 
well as the theory that the stock of capital, including land, 
does not increase in the same proportion AS does labour. 
Another important theoretical element is the dependency 
effect, which suggests that saving is more difficult for house-
holds when there are more children and that higher fertility 
causes social investment funds, to be diverted away from high 
productivity uses. Combined in simulation models. these ele-
ments suggest.that relatively high fertility and positive pop-
ulation growth have a negative effect on output per worker. 
These models (Pitchford 1974) a~sume a closed system where re-
sources ar~ fixed, diminishing returns occur, savings rates 
fall and stagnation sets in. As such, the models have no appli-
cability to Saudi Arabia, where outside resources in the form 
of oil revenues are continually augmenting domestic resources. 
On the other hand, there is some evidence that population 
growth may actually stimulate development. Conlisk and Huddle, 
(1969), for exampl~ regressed the output growth rate on the 
savings rate and the rate of population growth over roughly 
1950-1963 across the 25 less developed countries that received 
aid, an external source of funds. The coefficient of the pop-
ulation growth was 0.692 and was statistically significant, 
suggesting that an increment of population has, ceteris paribus, 
a positive effect on Eer capita income. 
Less controversial is the link between economic growth 
and mortality decline. Prior to the ~ra when the knowledge of 
cheap and effective public health intervention was developed, 
there is evidence to suggest that improvements in general 
living standards were the dominant source of mortality decline. 
Since that time, many new factors have come to the fore. Al-
though economic factors remain very irrportant in differentiating arrong nations 
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mortality levels, pure economic growth now appears to be an in-
effi~ient method of reducing mortality (Simon 1976). 
Diverting a dollar of income towards improved literacy 
appears to offer a far greater change for mortality reduction 
than allowing that money to either consumption or investment. 
Nations that have structured development in such a way as to 
increase levels of literacy and to spread public health and 
nutritional programmes widely among the population have achieved 
remarkable advances in lengthening life (Preston 1978). 
MORTALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
This pattern observed in numerous less developed count-
ries seems to hold for the Middle East. During the last few 
years, Bahrain, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were among the 
fastest growing economies in Western Asia. Mortality decline 
in these countries, however, has been modest to some. extent. 
It is likely that mortality will significantly decline 
in the Kingdom if past income gains are translated into social 
and health programmes. I~ in fact, the direct effect of this 
type of expenditure on mortality is much greater per dollar 
than that of"' income growth, and given the massive expenditure 
during the Second and Third Five Year Plan periods, there should 
be a fairly swift reduction of mortality in the Kingdom during 
the 1980s. 
MORTALITY IN SAUDI ARABIA 
In this regard there is plenty of room for improvement. 
According to the afore-mentioned multipurpose survey, the mor-
tality rate for the Saudi Population is 14.1 per 1,000. This 
rate is very close to the average of 14 countries in Western 
South Asia (1974), but nearly double the Kuwaiti rate of 7.2 
per 1,000. As with the .birth rate, the crude death rate is re-
lated to the degree of urbanization, increasing from 6 per 
1,000 in the Kingdom's six largest municipalities, to 16 per 
1,000 in the smaller municipalities, and finally to 18 per 
I .000 in the country's villages and other rural areas. 
Some of the more important f attors that may contribute to 
this urban/rural differential are the availability of hospitals, 
clinics and other types of health care facilities. Higher educa-
tion levels and the higher proportion of the younger age groups 
in the urban areas undoubtedly reinforce this pattern. 
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SAUDI ARABIAN POPULATION GROWTH 
If we accept the birth and death rates indicated by the 
multipurpose survey, then it is safe to conclude the Kingd9m's 
population is growing at a national rate of three per cent, or 
more, per year. 
The youthfulness (table 3) of the population and the 
large numbers of women that will be entering the fertile age 
group, ages 15 to 44, over the next decade, means that the pro-
cess of demographic transition and the attainment of a stable 
population will require several generations. Even if fertility 
begins to decline, the country can be expected to maintain a 
high rate of natural population growth well into the next 
century (table 4). 
IMMIGRATION 
Superim~osed on the high natural rates of population 
increase is extensive immigration into the Kingdom (Shaw 1979). 
Migrants are drawn i:n because wage rates in their own countries 
are significantly below those offered in Saudi Arabia. Their 
duration of stay is limited,being almost always less than three 
years. The typical expatriate worker is young (20 to 40 years), 
single, works-exclusively on a job he was hired for prior to 
arrival, transfers a large amount of his earnings to his home 
country, and does not plan to e~tablish permanent residence in 
the Kingdom. 
In 1975,there were approximately 773,000 foreign workers 
in the Kingdom. While no official figures exist as to the in-
crease in immigrants since that time, several unofficial est-
imates place the 1980 foreign work force in the Kingdom at 
around 2 million. 
The post 1973 oil boom was by no means the beginning of 
Saudi Arabia's increasing dependence on foreign manpower. Ever 
since a modern state structure began to emerge under King Abdul 
Aziz Ibn Saud in the 1930s and 1940s, skilled advisors and 
technicians have been brought in from the outside to run large 
areas of administration and industry. 
Until 1975, the majority of the immigrants have been 
coming from the Arab world. Since this dat~ the picture has 
begun to change: more and more unskilled workers are being 
imported from Asia. 
Since nearly all construction workers in the Kingdom are 
foreigners, an appreciation of the magnitude of this inflow 
can be obtained from the various estimates made of the manpower 





TABLE 3 SAUDI ARABIA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX; 




Age ~ex Sex 
Group Male Female Total Ratio Male Female Total Ratio 
Under 5 l 5. 9 1 7. l 16. 5 l 0 1 16.4 17. 5 16. 9 102 
5-9 13. B 15.0 14. 4 101 1 3. 1 14. 0 1 3. 5 102 
10-14 12. B 1 3. 2 12. 9 106 11. B 12. 4 1 2 • 1 104 
15-19 11. 2 10.9 11. 1 11 3 11. 2 11. 4 11. 3 lOB 
20-24 9. 7 8.4 9. 1 12 7 1 0. 5 9. 5 10.0 1 2 1 
25-29 7. 3 5. 9 6. 6 1 3·5 9. 0 7. 3 8. 2 136 
30-34 5. 5 5.2 5. 3 11 6 6.0 4. 9 5. 5 134 
35-39 4.8 5.0 4.9 106 4. 5 4. 3 4.4 114 
40-44 4. 4 4. 6 4. 5 104 3. 8 4. 1 3.9 102 
45-49 3. 7 3. 8 3. 8 106 3. 5 3. 8 3. 7 105 
50-54 3. 1 3. 1 3. 1 1 12 3. 0 3. 2 3. 1 104 
55-59 3 • 1 3. 2 3. 2 107 2.4 2. 5 2. 4 105 
60+ 4.6 4. 6 4. 6 110 4. 8 4.8 5. 1 104 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 110 100.0 100.0 100.0 110 


























TABLE 4 ILO FORECAST OF SAUDI ARABIAN POPULATION BY AGE GROUP: 1975-2000,BY THOUSANDS 
Male Female 
Age 
group 1975 1980 1985 1990 2oeo 1975 1980 1985 1990 
0-9 1,494 1 '7 5 3 2,024 2,307 2,788 1'44 9 1,698 1,960 2 '2 3 2 
10-14 542 641 768 898 1. 18 5 525 622 745 871 
15-19 461 533 631 759 1'03 1 444 5 16 613 736 
20-24 39 3 450 521 620 876 379 434 506 603 
25-44 1'050 1,203 1,385 1'60 2 2,225 1'016 1' 16 7 1,344 1'55 8 
,_. 45-54 297 341 394 455 615 294 339 391 454 
0 55-64 184 213 247 287 392 19 3 222 258 300 \J1 
65 and over 115 135 160 19 1 273 131 156 185 221 
Total 4 •• 5 34 5,269 6' 13 0 7' 119 9,385 4' 4 31 5' 154 6,002 6,976 
Source: International Labour Office: Labour Force: 1950-2000, Volume I: Asia (Geneva: 
International labour Office, 1977). 
2000 
2,695 
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targets set for it by the country's Second Five Year Develop-
ment Plan (1975-i980). 
When the required number of indirect labourers are added, 
over 2 million construction workers are estimated for 1980. 
This implies tha~ to meet plan targets, an increase of 1.8 
million foreign workers from the (1974) base of 220,000 would 
have to take place over the five year period. If productivity 
increases continue, the full capacity of the construction 
labour force is forecast to peak around 1986 to a total of 
2.25 million foreign workers. From the mid-1980s on, the fore-
ign work force is expected to slowly declin~ as increases in 
productivity accompany changes in technology and a general tape-
ring off of construction. 
Projections of the construction labour force usually start 
with the assumption of 400,000 workers directly related to the 
construction industry, in 1975. Projections made in 1975 using 
the conservative set of assumptions (table 5) about increases 
in labour productivity forecast 1,832,000 direct construction 
labourers in the Kingdom around 1980, assuming the construction 
industry is operating at the capacity required to meet the 
goals of the Second Development Plan. 
To understand the implications of these forecasts, it 
should be noted that even if only half the construction capa-
city is used, there would still be over 800,000 non-Yemeni, 
non-Saudi construction labourers in the Kingdom around 1980. 
On the other hand, if only half of the 1974 labour base, larg-
ely Yemenis, are replaced by foreigners, there will still be 
over 900,000 non-Yemeni, non-Saudi foreign construction labour-
ers, supervisors and support personnel in the Kingdom by 1980. 
Nor is this the full extent of the problem. Construction 
workers, especially supervisors and managers, often bring their 
households with them. For the sake of estimation, if we assume 
from past experience that all of the supervisors of the admini-
stration personnel and 20 per cent of the direct workers, 
brought their households with them, and each of these households 
added 1.5 more persons, then an additional 76,000 foreigners 
would be in the country in 1976. By 1980,that figure would in-
crease to 217,000. Given these assumptions as to the number of 
dependents together with those concerning the size of the full 
• 
capacity plan work force, there would be approximately 798,000 
construction workers and their families in the Kingdom in 1976, 
increasing to 2,287,000 by 1980. 
In addition, the spin-off effects of these construction 
jobs must be taken into account for a complete estimate of the 
likely foreign work force. Based on international experience, 
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an extremely conservative estimate would be one job created 
for every five construction workers. A more liberal, but still 
plausible assumption, is that one job is created for every two 
construction workers. 
Using the conservative figure, but excluding the family 
dependents discussed above, the Ministry of Planning has esti-
mated that 144,000 jobs in 1976, were generated by employment 
in the construction sector. 
The more liberal assumptions, concerning construction in-
duced employment, imply that there would be 1,083,000 construc-
tion and constructi~n related-jobs in 1976. Projecting the 
conservative figure to 1980 indicates by that date 2,484.000 
persons, would be working on, or serving, the construction 
population • 
It should be noted that construction accounts for over 52 
per cent of all development plan expenditures. If the total eco-
nomy reflects this distribution of construction/non-construction 
expenditures and if the capitalization ratio of the average non-
construction sector job is equal to or less than the construc-
tion sector, there could be as many non-construction foreign 
labourers as there are construction sector foreign labourers. 
Saudis are more likely to be a part of the labour force of 
thenorr-construction sector, so not as many foreigners are like-
ly to come to serve all other economic sectors as presently 
serve in the construction sector., but the percentage would be 
high in any case. 
At any rate, the actual inflow of foreign workers probably 
occurred on a scale unprecedented in modern history. 
CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE WORK FORCE 
In 1975, the vast majority of foreign workers in Saudi 
Arabia were from the regional Arab countries. Most of these were 
employed as unskilled labourers with, by far, the largest group 
coming from North Yemen. The latter are still the only group 
permitted to obtain residence permits untied to specific labour 
contracts, making them the only legal floating reservoir of 
workers in the Kingdom. 
Increasingly, however, the Saudis have been adopting the 
practice of controlled labour contratts whereby foreign workers 
are brought into the Kingdom for stipulated periods of time on 
specific jobs under block visas. As a result, the Yemenis are 
on specific jobs under block visas and, consequently the Yemenis 
are increasing as a percentage of the foreign work force (Halli-
day 1977). 
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Indeed, the proportion of Arab immigrant labour to the 
Kingdom is going steadily down. Several authorities feel the 
share of Arab foreign labour in Saudi Arabia has dropped to be-
low 50 per cent by 1985. One of the reasons given for this 
pattern is that the rapid increase in the ra~e of ~evelopment 
after 1973 found the traditional Arab exporting countries increas-
ingly unable to send more workers abroad. Jordan, for instance, 
has nearly one-third of its labour force outside the country. 
Thus, the Saudis were obliged to link increasingly elsewhere. 
Shortages of available Arab labour forced the Saudis to tap 
other labour pools. 
The substitution of Asians for Yemenis has been the major 
change in geographic composition since 1975, with the propor-
tion of immigrant labourers brought in from the far East and 
the lndian subcontinent growing from less than 5 per cerit in 
1975 to around 30 per cent by 1980. The growth in Korean work-
ers from 4,000 in 1975 to around 40,000 in 1980 was especially 
dramatic (Sidahmed 1981). 
Despite the attractiveness of foreign workers, the govern-
ment began steps in 1978 to control the flow of migrant workers 
into the country. Previously, official documents required for 
work in Saudi Arabia were easy to obtain and often never asked 
for by the Saudi authorities. This was particularly true for 
groups like the Yemenis who, at one time, travelled to Saudi 
Arabia without passports or visas. By imposing the responsibi-
lities of correct documentation on employees the government 
gained a degree of control over· its migrant work force unknown 
previously (Shierreff 1979). 
THIRD PLAN TARGETS 
Apparently, the Saudis have come to feel that their depen-
dence on foreign workers is no longer desirable. The projected 
increase in the size of the civilian labour force, over the 
Third Plan period (1980-1985), has been 155,000 (Ministry of 
Planning 1980). This represents an annual growth rate of 1.2 
per cent and corresponds to the difference between the new civi-
lian employment opportunities, 310,000, and the estimated 
number of people leaving agriculture, 70,000 and construction, 
85,000. 
Officially, the Saudi Arabian _government has stated that 
development in the Kingdom has reached the point whereby most 
jobs can be effectively manned with Saudi workers. To compen-
sate for the foreign workers and still attain the Third Plan 
targets, the level of productivity must increase by 27.2 per 
cent by the end of the Third Plan period. This is an average 
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annual rate of around 5 per cent. 
Finally, the population of Saudi Arabia, like the popul.a-
tion of most of the Arab oil exporting countries along the Arabian 
Gulf, has grown very rapidly since oil exporting began. This in-
crease stems both from internationai immigration and rapid rates 
of natural increase for both the indigenous and the immigrant 
populations. 
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